THIS IS AN ARTICLE COPIED FROM Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA):
Is deployment of the army an option?
Participation of the Indian armed forces in the anti-Naxal operations has so far been restricted. The Indian air force helicopters provide logistics and participate in rescue missions. A retired brigadier of the Indian Army is in
charge of the counter-insurgency training school in Chhattisgarh. However, skepticism prevails regarding widening the scope of the Army's involvement in direct combat operations. Even after the Naxalites opened fire and on one occasion damaged the helicopter rescuing injured Policemen in Chhattisgarh in September, the Union Government continues to sit in judgment over the request by the Air force to open defensive fire on the Naxals. Apart from the statements made by the Army itself, security experts are of the opinion that such a step would boomerang as the Army is not suited for such asymmetric warfare, particularly on its own territory and populace. Such an attitude, however, is rather inexplicable considering the fact that the Army continues to be deployed and is fulfilling its strategic objectives in the insurgency affected Northeast. The Army has helped develop an effective counter insurgency grid in Jammu& Kashmir, with the police personnel now playing a
more 'proactive role'. Indian Army has its own doctrine on sub-conventional warfare, which applies to insurgency and extremism affected areas. This 'anti-Army' belief is largely based on a premise that differentiates left-wing extremism from militancy in Jammu & Kashmir and the insurgencies of the Northeast. The 'Naxalites' in spite of their indulgence in wanton violence, are still considered “our people” who “do not demand secession”. An
analysis of the pattern of left-wing extremist violence, however, indicates little difference between these different categories of violent extremism. Although the Naxals are not known to receive funds from abroad, there are trends available to suggest their linkages with forces outside to procure arms and ammunition. Moreover, the Army possibly will be better suited for neutralizing the 'base area' centric Naxal activity. Naxal bases in the forested areas such as Abujhmad in Chhattisgarh and Saranda in Jharkhand has been a key factor behind their
military capacity. Police and para-military efforts to dislodge them from such “liberated zones” have either been a non-starter or a failure. There is a lot to learn from the Sri Lankan Army's anti- LTTE campaign. The Tamil rebels, with much advanced weapons and fighting skills, were after all defeated by the Sri Lankan Army. Interestingly, the Indian Army did participate in the 1971 offensive against the Naxalites, code named 'Operation Steeplechase'. The joint Army-Paramilitary- Police operation was carried out in July-August 1971 in West Bengal over a 45- day period, months before the liberation of Bangladesh. Three full-size divisions, besides the crack 50 Para Brigade were deployed. Although the Army did not fire a single bullet, their “area domination” enabled the Police and administration to penetrate the Maoist heartland.cite the 'poor' human rights record of the Army in denying it's a role in dealing with Naxalism. However, it is a fact that the state Police forces and the central para-military personnel have also been found to be involved in human rights violation cases. Arguments are also made about the lack of knowledge of the terrain and socio-cultural factors among the army personnel which makes them disadvantaged to deal with the extremists. This argument is equally true with the para-military. Only recently the CRPF has initiated an intelligence wing of its own. Compared to most of the state Police forces, the Army personnel are far better trained and equipped. Indian Army's counter-insurgency experience in Jammu & Kashmir and the Northeast makes it worthy of deployment in the Naxal affected areas. It is the Army and not the Police or the para-military, which has a doctrine of sub-conventional warfare. Given that the Communist Party of India- Maoist (CPI-Maoist) is making consistent attempts to forge ties with the
insurgents of the Northeast as well as the Jihadis, it will be the army with its superior firepower, training and decades-long experience in dealing with insurgency, which will be the most appropriate force to be deployed along with the Police and the para-military forces in Naxalite affected theatres in breaking these linkages. The Army may not defeat the enemy, but it will certainly prepare the ground for the same by reducing their fire power, a task that has not been achieved by the Police as well as the para-military. It will be sensible to make use the available resources, rather than to wait for the state Police forces to become capable of waging an effective war against the extremists. Sensitizing the Army in human rights issues would be a much easier and less time consuming task, rather than to create commandos out of state Police personnel. The army personnel will function under no political whims and fancies unlike the state Police forces who are subjected to local politics.
A Balanced Approach
In the long term there is an urgent need of building the capacity and effectiveness of the Police force in protecting the local populace. However, with the best of intentions, this would be a long-term project. In the near term, the army could be used to deny the Naxalites the luxury of time and space to reinforce themselves and increase their influence. Short-burst operations by the Indian army can be used to lessen the area dominance of the Naxalites. There is no denying the fact that ultimately the Police will provide a long term protection and defense against the extremists. But till the time the state Police forces' are capable to single-handedly take on the extremists, the Army can complement the efforts in providing the basic security and depriving the Naxalites the space of terrorizing the local populace and throttling development work in these areas. The Army can protect the populace under a 'populace protection strategy' and graudually transfer the task to the local Police forces in the long run.
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